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Finding Certainty in Determining 
whether a “De Facto Relationship” 




Section 2D(1) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 defines a “de facto 
relationship” as “a relationship between 2 persons … who live together as a couple”. 
Although the Act does not define “living together as a couple”, section 2D(2) & (3) 
provides that “[i]n determining whether 2 persons live together as a couple, all the 
circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, including … [a list of 9 
matters]” and that none of these 9 matters is “to be regarded necessary” and “a court 
is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as 
may seem appropriate … in the circumstances of the case” (emphases added). The 
seemingly unfettered discretion of the Court, delegated  by section 2D, may be helpful 
in pursuing a fair and just outcome for each case, but it also raises a great concern as 
to uncertainty. This paper examines some relevant cases and argues that “mutual 
commitment to a shared life” should be at the core of section 2D and be the most 
important test, and by which certainty can be found to a large extent, in determining 
whether a de facto relationship exists. Accordingly, this paper recommends that 
amendments should be made to the legislation to aid the interpretation and application 
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The purpose of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 is to recognise the equal 
contribution, including but not limited to financial contribution, of both spouses to a 
marriage partnership, of civil union partners to the civil union, and of de facto 
partners to the de facto relationship; and to provide for a just division of relationship 
property when their relationship ends.1 Therefore, determining whether there was a 
marriage, civil union or de facto partnership between the parties is a prerequisite to 
achieving these goals. Determining whether there was a marriage or a civil union 
relationship is a relatively easy task because the certificate and/or ceremony clearly 
indicate that the parties voluntarily contracted into the relationship. Where there is a 
lack of such a certificate or ceremony, establishing whether there was a de facto 
relationship between the parties is much more difficult, and even problematic and 
controversial, in some circumstances.  
 
Section 2D(1) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 defines a de facto relationship 
as a relationship between 2 persons who live together as a couple but the Act does not 
define “living together as a couple”. Rather, section 2D(2) provides that “all the 
circumstances of the relationship” are to be taken into account in determining whether 
2 people live together as a couple. Although a list of nine matters is provided, the list 
is non-exhaustive and none of these matters is to be regarded necessary and a court is 
“entitled to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in 
the circumstances of the case”.2  
 
Such a “definition” suggests that whether 2 persons live together as a couple is a 
matter of fact. As Chisholm J stated in O’Shea v Rothstein, “[t]here can be no hard 
and fast rule because all the circumstances of the particular case under consideration 
                                                            
1 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 1M.  
2 At s 2D(2) (emphases added). 
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have to be taken into account”. 3  The wording “all the circumstances”, “none of 
these … is necessary”, “to attach such weight to any matter as may seem 
appropriate …” seems to delegate an unlimited flexibility and an unfettered 
discretionary power to the Courts in deciding whether a “de facto relationship” exists 
in a particular case. While this flexibility and the court’s discretion may be helpful in 
pursuing a fair and just outcome in specific cases, it also raises a great concern as to 
uncertainty.  
 
This paper analyses some relevant cases and finds that courts tend to attach significant 
weight to “the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life”, as listed in section 
2D(2)(f), in determining whether two people are “living together as a couple”, 
although this is not a substitute of the “evaluative”4 and “common sense”5 approach. 
It is arguable that “mutual commitment to a shared life” is at the “core” of the section 
2D definition. It is therefore possible to find certainty to a large extent in determining 
whether a de facto relationship exists in a particular case. If this is so, amendments to 
the legislation to aid the interpretation and application of section 2D may be desirable. 
 
The Uncertainty Illustrated 
 
The starting point is section 2D of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, which 
provides: 
 
2D Meaning of de facto relationship 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a de facto relationship is a 
relationship between 2 persons (whether a man and a woman, or a 
man and a man, or a woman and a woman)— 
(a) who are both aged 18 years or older; and 
(b) who live together as a couple; and 
(c) who are not married to, or in a civil union with, one another. 
(2) In determining whether 2 persons live together as a couple, all 
the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, 
including any of the following matters that are relevant in a 
particular case: 
(a) the duration of the relationship: 
(b) the nature and extent of common residence: 
(c) whether or not a sexual relationship exists: 
                                                            
3 O’Shea v Rothstein HC Dunedin CIV-2002-412-8, 11 August 2003 at [19].  
4 Scragg v Scott [2006] NZFLR 1076 (HC) at [37]. 
5 At [64]. 
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(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any 
arrangements for financial support, between the parties: 
(e) the ownership, use, and acquisition of property: 
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life: 
(g) the care and support of children: 
(h) the performance of household duties: 
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. 
(3) In determining whether 2 persons live together as a couple,— 
(a) no finding in respect of any of the matters stated in subsection 
(2), or in respect of any combination of them, is to be regarded as 
necessary; and 
(b) a court is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach 
such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in 
the circumstances of the case. 
 
 
A simple semantic analysis of section 2D, as shown in the above (in the Introduction), 
would readily find that section 2D provides the Courts with a great flexibility and a 
seemingly unfettered discretion in deciding whether there was a “de facto relationship” 
in a particular case, which inevitably raises a great concern as to uncertainty.   
 
It seems that the uncertainty concern, initially raised by the simple semantic analysis 
of section 2D, is not illusory, but rather it is a real issue as illustrated by some 
judgments involving the determining of whether a de facto relationship exists. Some 
recent cases show how significantly different decisions can be made by judges based 
on the same, or materially similar, facts. In Public Trust v C [Relationship property]6 
the respondent and the appellant had resided together for nearly 21 years (1985-2006), 
although they had not had a sexual relationship since 1990. They had a daughter from 
the relationship. The respondent had a contemporaneous association with another 
woman with whom he had a son, and he was also involved in the upbringing of the 
son. The appellant and the respondent continued to reside in the same household, 
“cooperated in relation to the upbringing of their daughter, and entered into a business 
relationship whereby they farmed a property on a cooperative basis”7 even after the 
appellant had found out about the respondent’s relationship with another woman.  
 
Judge Brown for the Family Court observed that the case did not involve “a simple 
either/or situation”8 and “came to a clear conclusion”9 that there was a relationship of 
                                                            
6  Public Trust v C [Relationship property] [2009] NZFLR 514 (HC). 
7  At [37]. 
8  At [56]. 
9  At [37] (emphasis added). 
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living together as a couple (between the appellant and the respondent). On appeal, the 
High Court, in a different interpretation of those facts, reversed the decision and held 
that the parties were not in a de facto relationship.10 Panckhurst J criticized the Family 
Court judge for not expressly considering the issue of mutual commitment and had 
been influenced too much in finding non-existence of a de facto relationship between 
the respondent and the third party woman. Panckhurst J was of the view that “the 
present case demonstrates why the evaluation of the existence of a de facto 
relationship must remain flexible and, most of all, case-specific”. 11  While this 
statement is consistent with section 2D(3), it also shows how difficult it can be to 
achieve certainty in determining whether there was a de facto relationship in a 
particular case.  
 
As illustrated by this case, different weighting of the same factors can result in 
opposing conclusions. Arguably, the Family Court judge placed a great weight on the 
respondent’s long-term co-residence with the appellant whereas the High Court judge 
focussed more on the “lack of commitment to a shared life” indicated by the 
respondent’s “shared loyalties” to another woman. 
 
Another recent example which illustrates the uncertainty concern is B v F [De facto 
relationship].12 In this case, for the whole of the period between 1994 and 2004, Mr F 
spent many nights at Ms B’s property but he often slept at his parents’ home nearby. 
He showered, changed, and kept his clothes and personal possessions at his parents’ 
home. His mother also did his washing and ironing. Mr F spent time cooking and 
socialising at Ms B’s home and they were acknowledged by friends to be a couple. 
They did not have a joint bank account and there were no intertwined financial affairs 
between them, although Mr F provided significant financial support to Ms B and her 
children.  
 
                                                            
10 At [40]-[57]. 
11 At [37]. 
12 B v F [De facto relationship] [2010] NZFLR 67 (HC). 
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The Family Court held that the parties had not lived together as a couple. On appeal, 
the High Court reversed the judgment stating that the Family Court Judge had placed 
too much weight on occupation of the house. The High Court opined that:13   
 
The final judgment [of the Family Court] on whether the parties 
were living together in a qualifying relationship was reached by an 
overly mechanical application of non-exhaustive statutory criteria.  
 
The High Court attached much greater weight on the fact that “[they] presented 
themselves as a couple”.14 With no disrespect intended, it is hard to see how the High 
Court’s approach is more convincing than the Family Court’s. 
 
The above cases show how uncertain it can be in weighing up particular facts. It is 
difficult to find consistency between the Family Court judgments and the High Court 
judgments, and between judgments by the High Court, in the above cases. If the 
parties in Public Trust v C [Relationship property]15 were not living together as a 
couple, it is difficult to see how the parties in B v F [De facto relationship]16 could be 
held as living together as a couple17, as it is argued that the parties in B v F [De facto 
relationship] demonstrated less mutual commitment than the parties in Public Trust v 
C.18  
 
The above cases show how flexible the wording of section 2D is, and hence how 
uncertain it is to determine whether there is a de facto relationship in a particular 
circumstance. Thus the question arises: is it possible for the Courts to develop some 
guidelines or tests to aid in the interpretation and application of section 2D to 
particular cases so that certainty can be achieved in determining whether a de facto 
relationship exists?  
 
Guidelines Developed by Courts 
                                                            
13 At [50]. 
14 At [60]. 
15 Public Trust v C [Relationship property], above n 6 
16 B v F [De facto relationship], above n 12. 
17  Henaghan, Atkin, Clarkson & Caldwell Family Law in New Zealand (16th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2013) at 7.309. 
18 At 7.309.  
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Although prima facie Parliament seems to delegate to the Courts an “unfettered” 
discretionary power in concluding whether two people live together as a couple, it 
does not mean that the outcome of any relevant cases “varies with the length of the 
chancellor’s foot”. 19  The judicial system has tried and is still trying to develop 
guidelines to help judges make better decisions in cases where whether the parties 
lived together as a couple is an issue, although it is too early to say at this stage that 
the a systematic approach to cases has been introduced.  
 
One such attempt or effort can be found in Scragg v Scott 20 where the High Court 
gives useful general “guidelines” for determining whether a de facto relationship 
exists, such as: 
 
(a) “[M]any types of associations may properly fall into 
the category of a de facto relationship … For there to be 
a relationship there must be an emotional association 
between two persons”.21 “Some associations will clearly 
be de facto relationships such as … and proclaiming that 
they are a de facto couple sharing their lives. At the 
other end of the scale two persons may simply be 
lovers … without special bond or affiliation or 
emotional association …”.22 “There will be cases which 
are finely balanced …”.23 
 
(b) “Generalisations are to be avoided because every 
case is fact specific”. 24 “The test must be evaluative, 
with the Judge having to “weigh up … all the factors – 
not only those contained in s 2D, but also any others … 
and applying commonsense objective judgment to the 
particular case”.25 
 
                                                            
19 F Pollock (ed) Table Talk of John Selden (Selden Society, London, 1927) at 43. John Selden, an 
eminent seventeenth century jurist, criticised that equity “varies with the length of the Chancellor's 
foot" to show his concern about the uncertainty and unpredictability of the outcomes of equitable 
claims as a result of the situation that equity at the early stage had no fixed rules of its own so that each 
Chancellor gave judgement according to his own conscience.  
20 Scragg v Scott, above n 4. 
21 At [31]. 
22 At [31].  
23 At [36].  
24 At [37]. 
25 At [37]. 
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(c) “Courts are often required to assess multiple pieces 
of circumstantial evidence”26 and such evidence should 
be “viewed cumulatively, and through the application of 
common sense and proper reasoning”.27 “Weight to be 
given to individual pieces of circumstantial evidence 
may vary” and “[i]t is the cumulative weight of all 
factors whether specified in the Act or not…which is 
decisive”.28 “The approach must be broad, with various 
factors to be weighed up in an evaluative task, similar to 
those the Courts are frequently called upon to undertake 
when drawing conclusions form circumstantial 
evidence”.29 
 
Guidelines around procedure have also been developed by courts in other cases. One 
concerns the onus of proof. The person who claims that the parties live together as a 
couple has the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities and the applicant has the 
benefit of producing independent evidence.30 Another is about the proper approach of 
an appellate Court: “31  
 
The appellate court should form its own opinion without undue 
deference to the lower Court … [but] on issues of credibility, an 
appellate court should give appropriate weight to the conclusion of 
the Judge at first instance who has had the advantage of seeing and 
hearing the witnesses. 
 
Such guidelines developed by the Courts certainly offer some help to the judges and 
lawyers involving the task of determining whether a de facto relationship exists in a 
particular case. It is still quite uncertain, however, about what matters should to be 
taken into account and what weight should be attached to a particular matter in each 
case. Is it possible to find a test or yardstick for the determining of whether they 
parties were living together as a couple?  
 
Mutual Commitment as Yardstick? 
                                                            
26 At [64]. 
27 At [64]. 
28 At [64]. 
29 At [64]. 
30  Clitherow v Parker (High Court, Auckland, CIV-2006-404-000046, 23 November 2007) 
BC200762983; Hiroki v Gilbert (Family Court, Lower Hutt, FAM 2005-032-000527, 6 December 
2006). Cited in Henaghan, et al, above n 17. 
31 WPH v ITP [2009] NZFLR 745 (HC) at [15]-[17].  
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This paper undertook an observation of some case judgements involving whether a de 
facto relationship exists as an issue. It is found that the Courts tend to emphasise the 
importance of, and to attach much greater weight to, the matter of the “degree of 
mutual commitment to a shared life” in determining whether the parties were living 
together as a couple. It is discovered that in some cases the Courts did not find a de 
facto relationship due to the lack of “mutual commitment to a shared life” 
notwithstanding many other factors seemingly pointing in favour of the existence of a 
de facto relationship; whereas in other cases the Courts found a de facto relationship 
mainly due to the finding of sufficient “mutual commitment to a shared life” 
nevertheless many other factors pointing against the existence of a de facto 
relationship. It is worthwhile to discuss these two groups of cases in more details to 
show how important, and how great the weight attached thereto, the factor of “mutual 
commitment to a shared life” is.  
 
On one hand, the Courts have in some cases held that the parties did not live together 
as a couple mainly because there was insufficient mutual commitment for a shared life, 
notwithstanding many other factors pointing in favour of the finding of a de facto 
relationship. For example, in PZ v JC ,32 no de facto relationship was found mainly 
due to the lack of sufficient mutual commitment to a shared life, despite the existence 
of “an affectionate, mutually supportive, and close relationship” 33  which was 
considered in connection with the “degree of commitment to a shared life”.  
 
In L v P [Division of property],34 the parties had an association for 15 years and had 
had a child from the relationship. They also had shared accommodation from 1998 
until 2006. The High Court reversed the Family Court decision that the parties were 
living together as a couple. The High Court commented that the lower court Judge 
should have been influenced by the facts showing the parties physically assumed a 
common residence and commenced a shared life rather than the “arrangement”.35 The 
fact that the woman had been a prostitute and a lesbian contributed to the Court’s 
                                                            
32 PZ v JC [2006] NZFLR 97 (FC). 
33 At [47]. 
34 L v P [Division of property] [2008] NZFLR 401 (HC). 
35 At [48]. 
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view that “[h]er various relationships and liaisons are consistent with her view that 
she did not want to commit herself to a relationship with another party and live with 
that party as a couple”.36 The lack of mutual commitment, again, was the main reason 
why the High Court held that there was no de facto relationship between the parties.  
 
An extreme example in this group of cases is Public Trust v C [Relationship 
property],37 where the High Court held that the parties who had resided together for 
21 years and had a child together were not living together as a couple. It is suggested 
that the High Court had “no particular reason … except that the degree of commitment 
had not reached a sufficient stage … insufficient commitment for a Court to conclude 
that a de facto relationship had existed” [emphasis added].38 
 
Ruka v Department of Social Welfare,39 may also be relevant. In that case, the issue 
was whether the parties were living together in a relationship “in the nature of 
marriage” for the purpose of Social Welfare legislation. Thomas J, as part of the 
majority at the Court of Appeal, stated that “the relationship would not be in the 
nature of marriage … unless it exhibited a mutual commitment and an assumption of 
responsibility …”.40 This was referred to with support in Scragg v Scott.41 
 
On the other hand, the Courts in other cases held that the parties were living together 
as a couple mainly because sufficient mutual commitment to a shared life had been 
shown, despite many other pieces of evidence pointing against the existence of a de 
facto relationship. For example, in H v Y,42 the parties, who were not residing together, 
were held to be living together as a couple as, “living together as a couple is 
concerned with the intent of the couple to be partners, having a commitment to a 
shared life and demonstrating that by their conduct”.43   
  
                                                            
36 At [77]. 
37 Public Trust v C [Relationship property], above n 6. 
38 Henaghan et al, above n 17.  
39 Ruka v Department of Social Welfare [1997] 1 NZLR 154 (CA). 
40 Scragg v Scott, above n 4, at [32]. 
41 At [25]-[32].  
42 H v Y (Family Court, Dunedin, FP 012/287/98, 11 August 2004). 
43 At [25].  
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In Scragg v Scott, 44 a de facto relationship was found by the Family Court (and 
upheld by the High Court) and the relationship continued even after the appellant 
commenced another relationship with another woman. In discussing whether sexual 
fidelity may be a factor to be taken into account, the High Court stated that it depends 
on whether it indicates “a lack of commitment” [emphasis added], 45 which shows that, 
in assessing other factors, courts tend to consider their effects on “the degree of 
commitment to a shared life”. The High Court in this case referred to Horsfield v 
Giltrap 46 (a constructive and express trust case) and pointed out that: 47   
 
[I]t might be thought that if  a man and woman do not live together, 
nor have a sexual relationship, nor even plan to live together, nor 
have children, then they could not be in a de facto relationship.  
 
But in that case:48   
 
[T]he parties regarded themselves as a close and devoted couple 
who had committed themselves to each other…and were a 
partnership between a man and a woman, who professed love for 
each other and were prepared to commit to each other their 
emotional and financial resources” (emphases added).  
 
 
The High Court went on to add that: 49  
 
[a]lthough it was said that was ‘not a de facto union’ we have no 
doubt that it would have qualified as a ‘de facto relationship’ under 
the present legislation if such had been in force.   
 
 
Such a statement clearly shows how important the mutual commitment to each other 
could be in the finding of a de facto relationship, although “[t]he test must inevitably 
be evaluative, with the Judge having to weigh up as best her or she can all of the 
factors …”.50   
 
                                                            
44 Scragg v Scott, above n 4. 
45 At [44].   
46 Horsfield v Giltrap [2000] NZFLR 1047 (HC). 
47 Scragg v Scott, above n 4, at [37]. 
48 At [37]. 
49 At [37]. 
50 At [37]. 
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Similarly, in G v B, 51 the High Court upheld the Family Court’s finding that the 
parties continued the de facto relationship “whilst remaining totally committed to a 
long-term relationship”, even after they ceased cohabitation for a very long time, as 
“the living arrangements reached by the parties were their way of maintaining a fully 
committed relationship without spending every night together” (emphases added).52  
 
An extreme example in this group of cases, sharply in contrast to Public Trust v C 
[Relationship property],53 is B v F [De facto relationship]54 where the Mr F (who 
often slept, and showered, changed clothes and kept his clothes and personal 
possessions at his parent’s home) and Ms B, without any child from the relationship, 
were held by the High Court to be living together as a couple. The fact that “they were 
known to friends as a couple”, among other things, showed a “mutual commitment to 
a shared life”,55 which justified the Court’s conclusion.56   
 
The above two groups of judgements show how important the “mutual commitment to 
a shared life” could be in the finding of the existence of a de facto relationship. It 
seems that Courts tend to give this factor significant weight in their exercise of the 
“unfettered” discretion under section 2D. If this is so, some seemingly conflicting 
judgments could be reconcilable and hence certainty could be found to a large extent. 
For example, Public Trust v C [Relationship property] 57  and B v F [De facto 
relationship]58 may be reconciled on the basis that, in the former case, the lack of 
sufficient mutual commitment between the parties strongly influenced the High Court 
in the finding of no de facto relationship; whereas in the latter the sufficient mutual 
commitment was found which significantly influenced the High Court in finding a de 
facto relationship. In this sense, it seems that the “the degree of mutual commitment 
                                                            
51 G v B [2006] NZFLR 1047 (HC). 
52 At [32], [36] and [37].  
53 Public Trust v C [Relationship property], above n 6. 
54 B v F [De facto relationship], above n 12. 
55 It is conceivable that the Court attached significant weight to the fact that the parties were known to 
friends as a couple. The outward appearance of the relationship matters as showing friends that they 
were a couple indicates their mutual commitment to a shared life. Arguably, representing themselves as 
a couple to friends and family members has similar effects, to some extent, to a civil union ceremony in 
respective of signifying their mutual commitment.    
56 B v F [De facto relationship] above n 12, at [51] & [68]. 
57Public Trust v C [Relationship property], above n 6. 
58 B v F [De facto relationship] above n 12. 
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to a shared life”59 does provide some certainty in determining whether a de facto 
relationship exists in a particular case.  
 
The importance of “mutual commitment” has also been emphasized by academics, 
one of which, for example, stated “what needs to be present is a measure of mutual 
commitment by the parties to the relationship” or “a commitment to a long term 
relationship”.60 It is argued that for a de facto relationship, “one factor that is essential 
is the parties’ mutual commitment to a shared life”.61  
 
Most significantly, Miller J stated in the very recent case of DM v MP: 62 
 
[I]t has been suggested that one of them, mutual commitment to a 
shared life, lies at the core of the definition.63 I take that to mean 
that a mental commitment to sharing life is normally required of a 
de facto relationship. The other indicia establish, however, that 
such commitment may be evidenced by conduct. (Emphasis added) 
 
From this statement by Miller J at the High Court, a mutual commitment to a share 
life is normally required for a de facto relationship notwithstanding section 2D(3) 
provides none of the nine matters listed in section 2D(2) is “necessary”. If this is so, it 
is arguable that “the degree of mutual commitment to a share life” can be a “test” in 
most circumstances hence provides certainty to a large extent in determining whether 
a de facto relationship exists in a particular case.  
 
The Core Meaning of Living Together as a Couple 
 
A legal concept must have its core. What is the core of a de facto relationship? 
Borrowing Hart’s idea about “core” and “penumbra” of concepts, 64  arguably the 
“mutual commitment to a shared life” is the core meaning of “living together as a 
                                                            
59 As listed in section 2D(2)(f) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.  
60 Simon Jefferson “De facto or ‘friends with benefits’?” (2007) 5 NZFLJ 304 at 305. 
61 Nicola Peart “The Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001: A Conceptual Change” (2009) 39 
VUWLR 813 at 823.  
62 DM v MP [2012] NZFLR 385 (HC) Miller J at [27]. 
63 Scragg v Scott, above n 4, at [32]; see also Peart above n 61 at 822; and the Justice and Electoral 
Select Committee Report on the Matrimonial Property Bill and Supplementary Order Paper No 25 at 7. 
64 H L A Hart “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. 
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couple”. A core case would be one that the statute is intended to cover, whereas a 
penumbra case would be one not considered by the statute maker.65 A judge may 
consider whether the particular case at hand is intended to be included by the 
Parliament as a de facto relationship. The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 treats 
marriage, civil union and de facto partnership equally as partnerships. The core 
meaning of de facto partnership must be a fundamental aspect which justifies such a 
treatment by the Parliament. Arguably the most fundamental aspect of a de facto 
partnership is the partners’ sufficient mutual commitment to a shared life, by which a 
de facto partnership shares the important similarity or common characteristic with a 
marriage partnership or a civil union partnership and is distinguished from other 
relationships such as “cohabited friends with benefits”. The Justice and Electoral 
Select Committee Report on the Matrimonial Property Bill and Supplementary Order 
Paper No 25 specifically refers to “mutual commitment to a shared life” as being at 
the core of the definition of section 2D.66  
 
It could be observed that the core meaning of the de facto relationship concept exists 
and has been upheld by the judges, notwithstanding the different approaches taken 
and the emphases of different indicia in the judgments discussed above. In the 
majority of the decided cases, judges have consensus as to whether a “de facto 
relationship” exists or not. If, as Miller J stated in DM v MP,67 a mutual commitment 
to a shared life is normally required, then the absence of such a mutual commitment 
would indicate the relationship at issue does not fall within the contemplation of the 
Parliament in enacting the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. Even if disagreement 
(or uncertainty) exists in some borderline cases, at least judges could still agree as to 
whether a particular case is a borderline case. In this sense, family lawyers are in a 
much better and more certain position than their counterparts who deal with tax 
avoidance cases. In many instances where tax avoidance is an issue, judges cannot 
even reach an agreement as to whether a particular case is a borderline case but judges 
on both sides often declare with strong confidence that the particular case clearly is, 
or is not, a case of tax avoidance.68  
                                                            
65 H L A Hart, above n 64. 
66 Justice and Electoral Select Committee Report, above n 63, at 7.  
67 DM v MP, above n 62, at [27]. 
68 This has been observed by many academics. See, for example, Michael Littlewood “The Privy 
Council and the Australian Anti-Avoidance Rules” [2007] 2 BTR 175. 
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From the above analysis of the case judgements, and with the support from the 
academic comments and the Justice and Electoral Select Committee Report, it seems 
the “degree of mutual commitment to a shared life” could be the core meaning (or at 
least one of the core meanings) of the phrase “living together as a couple”. This 
research has not found a case to date where the Court found no de facto relationship in 
circumstances where “sufficient mutual commitment to a shared life” had been found; 
and vice versa. However, in order to ascertain whether such a preliminary finding 
based on the analysis of a limited number of cases can be proved, further research 
may be required. Ideally, an empirical study on all cases where a de facto relationship 




Case authorities show that to a large extent other factors are considered in assessing 
the “degree of commitment to a shared life”, which has been given a significant 
weight in determining whether a de facto relationship exists in particular 
circumstances. As a “commitment to a shared life” is “normally required of a de facto 
relationship”, 69  arguably it should be a test, or the most important factor to be 
considered to allow for certainty when determining whether a de facto relationship 
exists.   
 
If this is so, it may be desirable to make an amendment to section 2D of the Act, to 
the effect that, in determining whether two persons live together as a couple, the court 
should “normally consider, and attach greater weight (than other factors) to, the 
degree of commitment to a shared life”. Such an amendment will not significantly 
change the existing law, but it could provide judges and legal practitioners much 




                                                            
69 DM v MP, above n 62, at [27] per Miller J.  
